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Abstract
A multi-task principal-agent model is employed to derive optimal environmental li-
ability rules for risk neutral managers under two alternative organizational structures:
a functional organization and a product-based organization. For a product-based orga-
nization it is shown that e¢ ciency is independent of whether the rm or managers are
liable for environmental damages. In a functional organization it is optimal either to hold
the rm liable for environmental damages or, equivalently, not to hold the production
managers liable for environmental damages. We derive conditions to obtain the rst-
best solution for a given organizational structure. Finally, the organizational form that
induces the highest environmental e¤ort induces the lowest production e¤ort and vice
versa. This suggests that production and environmental protection are substitutes rather
than complements.
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1 Introduction
Corporations are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) in maintaining and enhancing shareholder value. Within the array of CSR
related activities, corporationsdecision-making process towards environmental protection as
a way of mitigating legal implications of environmental liability is a key issue (e.g., Kerr
et al., 2009). From an organizational design perspective, the natural question that arises
is how to optimally allocate environmental liability within the boundaries of a corporation.
We address this question by examining the interaction between environmental liability and
a corporations organizational structure. By recognizing the importance of embedding envi-
ronmental liability into a corporationsdecision-making process, the aim of the paper is to
shed light on this interaction. The paper demonstrates the tight interdependence between
environmental liability and a corporations organizational structure.
To investigate this interdependency, we employ a multi-task principal-agent (MTPA)
framework, which serves as a natural way to study the interaction between incentives and
behavior at corporate and managerial levels. In particular, we adopt and amend the model
developed by Besanko et al. (2005), who make a distinction between a functional organi-
zation and a product-based organization. When a corporation is organized according to a
functional design it consists of several functional divisions, such as production, research and
development, marketing, nance, human resources, and environmental protection. In the
case of a product-based design, the corporation is organized into product lines. To foster
transparency, and without loss of generality, we assume that if a corporation has a functional
design it features a simple two-divisional structure: one division taking care of production of
the nal good and the other division taking care of environmental protection. Both divisions
a¤ect the level of gross prots and the expected level of environmental damage.
We show that the choice of the organizational structure has implications for the optimal
allocation of liability within the corporation. Following the case of risk averse managers,
our analysis reveals that the allocation of liability between the rm and manager does not
matter for e¢ ciency in a product-based organization. The neutrality of the allocation of
liability in a product-based organization is an extension of the neutrality proposition initially
obtained by Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984). This result is similar to the Coase (1960)
theorem in the sense that in a world without transaction costs the initial allocation of property
rights does not matter for ine¢ ciency. Arlen and MacLeod (2005) have conrmed this in an
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applied analysis of care organizations. However, the neutrality proposition does not hold in
a functional organization, implying that the allocation of liability does matter in the case of
a rm organized into functional areas. We nd that in a functional organization it is optimal
either to hold the rm liable for environmental damages or, equivalently, not to hold the
production managers liable for environmental damages.
Further, our analysis shows that there is a trade-o¤ between environmental and produc-
tion e¤ort: the organizational set-up which induces the highest environmental e¤ort induces
the lowest production e¤ort and vice versa. Thus, there is always a dominant function: either
production or environmental protection. This implies that production e¤ort and environmen-
tal e¤ort are substitutes and do not interact in a complementary fashion.
The relevant literature in the environmental domain using a MTPA framework goes back
to Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1993, 1998). For instance, Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné
(1993) analyze the e¤ect of monetary incentives on environmental risk-reducing activities
within corporations. The emphasis of their analysis is twofold. First, they explicitly take
into account that there are objective upper bounds to the amount of e¤ort that can be un-
dertaken by an individual agent. Second, they analyze how the accuracy of technology 
used to monitor the e¤ort levels  a¤ects the optimal incentive schemes. We extend Gabel
and Sinclair-Desgagné (1993) in two ways. First, we analyze the e¤ects of environmental
penalties on the organizational structure. Second, instead of incorporating the incentives ex-
ogenously into the model, we endogenously derive the incentives for environmental protection
from the corporates prot-maximizing behavior and assess how these incentives a¤ect the
corporations functioning through the lens of the organizational structure.
A related strand of literature that use MTPA models assesses the relative e¢ ciency of
di¤erent penalty schemes; for example, civil liability of the corporation versus civil liability of
individual managers, or criminal sanctions taken against individual managers. Seminal con-
tributions in this tradition1 are Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984, 1988), whereas Segerson
and Tietenberg (1992) o¤er a rst application to the specic problem of environmental en-
forcement. MTPA has also been applied to job design issues (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991) and more recently to the study of incentives and allocation for teaching and research
in universities (Gautier and Wauthy, 2007). Corts (2006) o¤ers a more fundamental study
examining the interplay between tasks and asset ownership. Further, the literature on vicar-
1See Kraakman (2000) for a review.
3
ious liability (Kornhauser, 1982, 1984) traditionally compares the e¢ ciency of imposing civil
liability on the principal rather than on the agent. Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) also con-
sider the possibility of criminal sanctions imposed on managers. To foster transparency and
clarity throughout the analysis, we concentrate here on the incentive structure and exclude
the option of having criminal sanctions; we leave this as an area for further research.
Following Kornhauser (1982), we consider the case of strict liability and assume that in a
product-based organization manager i pays a penalty that is equal to environmental damage
caused by product i. In a functional organization, environmental damages are always a
joint product of the environmental and the production managers e¤ort, even if there are no
spillovers between product lines. If the legal system requires the courts to show individual
causation in order to impose liability, then, of course, it is impossible to hold individual
managers liable in a functional organization (see Kornhauser, 1982). However, as our purpose
is to determine how di¤erent possible rules a¤ect the organizational structure, we presume
that in a functional organization all managers are held jointly liable. This means that, in
our situation of two functional areas, each manager pays a ne that is proportional to total
damage, with the sum of the nes equal to total environmental damage.2 This exact allocation
of liability between the two managers will be treated as exogenous in a rst stage. However,
we will show below that either this allocation does not matter or that the environmental
manager should bear the complete burden of liability.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model and examines
the distinctive features of a product-based and a functional organization. In Section 3 we solve
and analyze the model for both the functional and product-based organizational structure.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The basic setup of the underlying model is inspired by Besanko et al. (2005). Consider
a rm that consists of a risk-neutral owner and two risk-averse managers. The rm sells
two products: 1 and 2. There are two functional areas: environmental protection E and
production P . Production should be seen here as a proxy for all non-environmentally related
functional areas. For product i = 1; 2, denote ei and pi as the e¤ort levels the managers
2Without this last assumption, for equal environmental damages the total amount of nes paid under the
two organizational structures would then be di¤erent. Therefore, this assumption allows us to isolate any
possible e¤ect in this respect.
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expend on functions E and P respectively. In a functional organization ei is the e¤ort of the
environmental manager to reduce the emissions of product i; in a product-based organization
ei is the e¤ort of the manager that is responsible for product line i to reduce the emissions
associated with his product. A similar intuition applies to pi: Whereas it expresses the
e¤ort of the production manager to manufacture product i in a functional organization, in
a product-based organization pi represents the e¤ort of the manager that is responsible for
product line i to manufacture his product. The e¤ort levels are endogenous and cannot be
veried by outside parties. Therefore, they cannot form the basis for enforceable contracts.
Let zTi = (pi; ei) (with i = 1; 2) and v
T
i = (i1; i2) (with i = e; p) denote the e¤ort vectors
in a product-based and functional organization respectively. It is assumed that the disutility
of e¤ort for a divisional manager in a product-based organization is given by Ci (zi); in case
of a functional organization the disutility of e¤ort is Ci (vi) : That is, the product manager
must decide how to allocate e¤ort between the two products while the functional manager
must decide how to allocate e¤ort between the two functional tasks. It is assumed there are
diseconomies of spanwhen a manager has to split his time and attention between di¤erent
tasks, and these diseconomies of span are the extra costs as a result of this (Besanko et al.,
2005). The size of these costs are measured by the cross-partials @Ci(zi)@pi@ei ,
@Ci(vi)
@ei@ej
and @Ci(vi)@pi@pj .
To avoid any prior bias in favour of one of the possible organizational structures, we assume
that the cost of e¤ort does not depend on the type of task to which it is allocated, but only
on the amount of e¤ort.
Assuming perfect symmetry, these e¤ort levels have two results. First, prots before
wages and environmental penalties are:3
i = i (pi; ei; pj ; ej) i = 1; 2 i 6= j (1)
with @i()@pi > 0 and
@i()
@ei
< 0. The latter term expresses the idea that environmental protec-
tion leads to changes in the production process (e.g., the purchase of abatement equipment)
that increase production costs in the short run. No assumptions are made with respect to
the sign of the spillover e¤ects, @i(:)@pj and
@i(:)
@ej
. For instance, these spillover e¤ects could
capture the idea that marketing and R&D e¤orts expended on behalf of one product can
often benet the rms other products as well (Besanko et al., 2005). Alternatively, this
formulation allows for individual managers to undertake sabotage actions against other
3From now on we will refer to this as gross prots.
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managers if there are conicts of interests between the di¤erent departments. Furthermore,
it is assumed that prots (1) can be measured without noise.
Environmental damage, D; from manufacturing product i read as:
Di = Di (pi; ei; pj ; ej) ; i = 1; 2 i 6= j (2)
where @Di()@pi > 0 and
@Di()
@ei
< 0. As with prots, we also make no prior assumptions with
respect to the signs of the spillover e¤ects. Equations (1) and (2) are based on the assumption
that the link between e¤ort on the one hand, and prots and environmental damages on the
other hand, does not depend on the organizational structure of the rm, i.e., a given vector
of e¤ort allocations will result in the same gross prots or environmental damages, whatever
the organizational structure. While this may seem a restrictive assumption, this is the only
way to isolate how di¤erent organizational structures a¤ect the cost of e¤ort undertaken by
the managers on the one hand, and the risk incurred by these managers on the other hand.
Now several possibilities exist. First, suppose that the environmental regulator observes
the following veriable sign of environmental quality ~D linked to product i:
~Di = Di + ~"i; i = 1; 2 (3)
where the measurement error ~"i has zero mean and (~"1;~"2) follows a bivariate normal distri-
bution with the following variance-covariance matrix:

D =

2D s
2
D
s2D 
2
D

: (4)
The term 2D is the variance of measured environmental quality and s 2 [ 1; 1] is the corre-
lation between product-line environmental damages. This formulation with two identiable
signals makes sense if the two products are produced on di¤erent locations or lead to emissions
of di¤erent pollutants. The term s 6= 0 then expresses that the noise in the measurement
of these signals is correlated, possibly because the signals are measured by the same type of
equipment or by the same inspectors.4 Further, following Besanko et al. (2005), we assume
that it is impossible to identify the contributions of the functional areas.
Let us next move to the incentives within the rm. In a seminal paper, Holmstrom
(1979) showed that incentive schemes should incorporate all signals that allow to reduce the
4 If the two products are produced on the same location and lead to the emission of the same pollutants, then
the environmental regulator can only measure a signal of total environmental damages ~Dtot =
P
i=1;2Di+~"i:
However, considering this case is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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noise in the measurement of an agents e¤ort levels. Our model captures four performance
measurements: product-line prots and observed environmental performance, i.e., 1; 2; ~D1
and ~D2: As commonly done in the literature (for a seminal justication, see Holmstrom and
Milgrom,1987), we will restrict the compensation packages that are provided by the rm to
be linear functions of these variables. Somewhat less conventional, the incentive schemes
will be limited to a subset of these variables. Indeed, it can be veried that a contract
which depends on all these variables simultaneously is always overdetermined, both in a
functional and in a product-based organization. This implies that there are redundancies
in the information provided by these signals, which is not surprising taking into account
that with spillover e¤ects there are reciprocal externalities between the managers. Hence,
compensation of product managers is only linked to the performance in their own generated
product. Similarly, compensating functional managers is only linked to performance in their
own eld. In other words, the job title of each manager corresponds to the particular vector
of performance signals the rm holds him responsible for. We will argue below that it is not
possible to improve upon these schemes.
If the contributions of individual products to pollution can be observed and in case strict
liability is imposed on the managers, total wages ~Wi received by the manager of product
division i = 1; 2 read as:
~Wi = ai0 + (i; ~Di)ai   ~Di; (5a)
where ai0 is a constant and aTi  (ai ; aDi) representing the payment schedule for a product
division. Strict liability implies that ~Di is also the penalty schedule imposed by the regulator
on manager i. If the rm adopts a functional organization, payments read:
~We = e0 + ~D
Te    e( ~D1 + ~D2); (5b)
~Wp = p0 + 
Tp    p( ~D1 + ~D2); (5c)
where e0 and p0 are constants, Te  (D1 ; D2) represents the payment schedule for an
environmental division and Tp  (1 ; 2) is the payment schedule for a production division,
while T  (1; 2) and ~DT  ( ~D1; ~D2). Finally,  i( ~D1 + ~D2) denotes the penalty schedule
imposed by the regulator on manager i in a functional organization, with  e +  p = 1.
The expected utility for manager i can be written as:
EUi  E( ~Wi)  1
2
V ar( ~Wi)  Ci(); (6)
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where  > 0 represents the managers degree of risk aversion, which is assumed to be constant
and the same for all managers. For notational convenience, let W 

0 0
0 1

, u 

1
1

and v 

0
1

. Taking into account that the only non-deterministic component of the
managers utility function is environmental damage, it is straightforward to verify that the
variances of the compensation schemes ~Wi are equal to:
V ar( ~Wi) = 
2
D(1 + a
T
i Wai   2aTi v); (7a)
V ar( ~We) = 
T
e 
De + 2(1 + s) 
2
e
2
D   2(1 + s) e2DTe u; (7b)
V ar( ~Wp) = 2(1 + s) 
2
p
2
D: (7c)
Manager is expected utility, as expressed by (6), can now explicitly be specied for the two
distinguished organizational structures. Substituting (5a) and (7a) into (6), the expected
utility for managers in a product-based organization reads as expected wages minus the
expected liability payments, minus the risk premium, and minus the disutility of e¤ort:
EUi = ai0+(i(zi; zj);Di(zi; zj))
T ai Di(zi; zj)  
2
2D(1+ a
T
i Wai  2aTi v) Ci (zi) i 6= j
The expected utilities of managers that are engaged in a rm with a functional structure
can be derived in the same way. That is,
EUe = e0 + (D1 (vE ; vP ) ;D2 (vE ; vP ))
T e    e
0@X
i21;2
Di (vE ; vP )
1A (8a)
 
2
 
Te 
De + 2(1 + s) 
2
e
2
D   2(1 + s) e2DTe u
  C (ve) ;
EUp = p0 + (1 (vE ; vP ) ;2 (vE ; vP ))
T p    p
0@X
i21;2
Di (vE ; vP )
1A (8b)
 (1 + s) 2p2D   C (vp) :
Following Besanko et al. (2005), we normalize the managersreservation utility to zero.
The intercept of the compensation schemes can then be used to satisfy the participation
constraint.5 In that case, the owners objective is to maximize total surplus, i.e. prots
5Note that the participation constraint is expressed in expected terms. This means that there is no guarantee
that the managers will obtain their reservation utility for all possible realizations of the stochastic variable.
This implies that it is possible that  for some realizations of the stochastic variable  the managers will
have to make a nancial transfer to the rm (rather than the other way around) and that this transfer exceeds
their assets. With imperfect capital markets the managers might not be able to borrow against their future
wages and le for bankruptcy (or with imperfect insurance markets they will not be able to insure themselves
against extreme contingencies).
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minus risk premium, minus disutility of e¤ort, minus penalties imposed on the managers,
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
In case of a product-based organization, the IC constraint for i = 1; 2 is:
(Qi;Si) ai   Si = Ci; (9)
where Qi =
 
@i
@pi
@i
@ei
!
, Si =
 
@Di
@pi
@Di
@ei
!
and Ci =
 
@Ci
@pi
@Ci
@ei
!
.
Under a functional organizational structure the IC constraint for i = e; p is:
Tee    eTeu = Ce; (10a)
Rpp    pTpu = Cp: (10b)
with Te =
 
@Di
@ei
@Dj
@ei
@Di
@ej
@Dj
@ej
!
, Tp =
 
@Di
@pi
@Dj
@pi
@Di
@pj
@Dj
@pj
!
; and Rp =
 
@i
@pi
@j
@pi
@i
@pj
@j
@pj
!
. Also, Ce = 
@Ci
@ei
@Ci
@ej
!
and Cp =
 
@Ci
@pi
@Ci
@pj
!
. We have now completed the full description of the model.
Next we will examine how the various conditions apply to the two organizational regimes and
analyze and compare the organizational structures assuming managers are risk-averse.
3 Analysis of organizational structures
3.1 Product-based organization
In a product-based organization the owner of the rm maximizes
prod =
X
i=1;2;i6=j
h
i(zi; zj) Di(zi; zj)  Ci (zi)  
2
V ar( ~Wi)
i
(11)
subject to the IC constraints (9). Straightforward calculations and rearranging terms lead to
the following explicit solution for (9):
ai =
@Di
@ei
@Ci
@pi
  @Di@pi
@Ci
@ei
@i
@pi
@Di
@ei
  @i@ei
@Di
@pi
; (12a)
aDi =
@i
@pi
@Ci
@ei
  @i@ei
@Ci
@pi
@i
@ei
@Di
@pi
  @i@pi
@Di
@ei
: (12b)
Substituting these expressions back into (7a) one obtains:
V ar( ~Wi) =
 
@i
@ei
@Ci
@pi
  @i@pi
@Ci
@ei
@i
@pi
@Di
@ei
  @i@ei
@Di
@pi
!2
: (13)
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It is now straightforward to verify that a product-based organization would lead to exactly
the same prots if the environmental nes were imposed directly on the rm. To see this
note that if the nes are imposed on the rm, the IC constraint becomes (Qi;Si) ai = Ci:
Then solving for ai and aDi ; and substituting back into (7a), leads again to (12). Also, total
surplus for given e¤ort levels is the same as when the nes are imposed on the managers. We
can subsequently conclude that the optimization problem is the same under both regimes.
Thus even without solving the model explicitly for optimal e¤ort levels, we obtain that the
managersrisk aversion is not an argument against holding them liable rather than the rm.
In other words, who has to pay the nes does not a¤ect how risk is shared between the
rm and its managers. This conrms the neutrality proposition we announced in Section 1.
That is, the allocation of liability between principal and agents does not matter with costless
contracting and solvent agents (Kornhauser, 1982; Sykes, 1984; Arlen and MacLeod, 2005).6
Proposition 1 In a product-based organization, e¢ ciency does not depend on whether en-
vironmental liability is imposed on the rms or on the managers if managers are solvent.
We can now determine the optimal e¤ort levels. By substituting the IC constraints in
(11) one obtains the rst-order conditions for the optimal e¤ort levels:
Qi   Si +Qj   Sj   Ci   
2
(Ki +Kj) = 0; (14)
where Ki =
 
@V ar( ~Wi)
@pi
@V ar( ~Wi)
@ei
!
and Kj =
0@ @V ar( ~Wj)@pi
@V ar( ~Wj)
@ei
1A. If the managers pay the nes, then
(14) and (9) imply that their wages are given by:
ai = (Qi + Si)
 1

Qi +Qj   Sj   
2
(Ki +Kj)

: (15)
Alternatively, if the rm pays the nes, then (14) and the fact that the IC constraint equals
(Qi;Si) ai = Ci; the managerswages are given by:
ai = (Qi + Si)
 1

Qi +Qj   Sj   Si   
2
(Ki +Kj)

: (16)
From (15) and (16) we see that the cross partial derivatives cancel out. This implies that
diseconomies of span does not a¤ect the optimal incentive scheme, although it does a¤ect
the optimal e¤ort levels. The reason is that diseconomies of span a¤ect the rms and the
managers objective function in exactly the same way.
6 In reality a rms assets will typically be larger than that of a manager and a rm will therefore generally
be able to a¤ord higher monetary penalties than an individual manager.
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3.2 Functional organization
In a functional organization where the managers pay the nes total surplus reads:
func = 1 (ve; vp) + 2 (ve; vp)  (D1 (ve; vp) +D2 (ve; vp)) (17)
 C (ve)  C (vp)  
2
(Te 
De + 2(1 + s) 
2
e
2
D
 2(1 + s) e2DTe u)  (1 + s) 2p2D;
which is to be maximized subject to the IC constraints (10a) and (10b), and with
P
i=e;p  i =
1: As for the product-based organization, one can determine the wages and variances that
will induce a given e¤ort vector. That is, solving (10a) for e, we obtain:
Di =
@Dj
@ej

@Ci
@ei
+  e
@Di+Dj
@ei

  @Dj@ei

@Ci
@ej
+  e
@Di+Dj
@ej

@Di
@ei
@Dj
@ej
  @Di@ej
@Dj
@ei
: (18)
Substitution of this expression in (7b) yields the following expression for the variance of the
environmental managers wages:
V ar( ~We) =
0@ @Dj@ej

@C
@ei
+  e
@Dj
@ei

  @Dj@ei

@C
@ej
+  e
@Dj
@ej

@Di
@ei
@Dj
@ej
  @Di@ej
@Dj
@ei
1A2 : (19)
In a symmetric equilibrium, @Dj@ei =
@Di
@ej
and @Di@ei =
@Dj
@ej
. The variance expression then further
simplies to:
V ar( ~We) =
 
@C
@ei
@Di
@ei
+
@Dj
@ei
!2
: (20)
Now suppose that nes are imposed directly onto the rm instead of onto the man-
agers. The only stochastic component in the wages is now the incentives provided to the
environmental manager. The variance of the environmental managers wage then reduces to
Te 
De, whereas the production managers wage is now deterministic. Consequently, the
rms objective function becomes:
func = 1 (ve; vp) + 2 (ve; vp)  (D1 (ve; vp) +D2 (ve; vp)) (21)
 C (ve)  C (vp)  
2
Te 
De:
The IC constraint of the environmental manager reduces to Tee = Ce, whereas the IC
constraint for the production manager reduces to Rpp = Cp. Substitution of e in Te 
De
shows that the variance of the environmental managers income is the same, irrespective of
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whether the ne is paid by the rm or by him. As the production managers income is
deterministic under a functional organization, we can conclude that:7
Proposition 2 The neutrality proposition does not hold in a functional organization. How-
ever, if no liability is imposed onto the production manager or if the production manager is
risk-neutral, then it does not matter whether the rm or the environmental manager pays the
ne.
Let us now determine the optimal e¤ort levels if the environmental manager pays the
ne. After substitution of the IC constraints into the rms objective function, the rst-order
condition for the e¤ort levels of the environmental manager is given by
Re   Te   
2
Me

u = Ce; (22)
where Re =
 
@i
@ei
@i
@ej
@i
@ej
@i
@ei
!
and Me =
0@ @V ar( ~We)@ei
@V ar( ~We)
@ej
1A. The rst-order condition for the e¤ort
levels for the production manager are given by
(Rp   Tp)u = Cp: (23)
Above we argued that the risk imposed on the production manager is independent of the
incentive scheme received by the rm but only on the risk imposed by the environmental
nes. Equation (23) shows that the nes do not a¤ect the rst-order condition for e¢ ciency,
and they should therefore not a¤ect incentives either. However, if such a situation applies,
the only e¤ect of the nes is that they impose a risk on the production manager, without
incentive e¤ect. Therefore, they are a deadweight loss. Hence, it is socially optimal to set the
penalty on the production manager equal to zero ( p = 0). In that case, as in a product-based
organization, the neutrality proposition again holds. From (22) we see that the environmental
manager optimally allocates his e¤ort equally between the two product lines, which conrms
that we have perfect symmetry.
The main result when managers are risk-neutral is straightforward. In that case  = 0,
implying that the ICs are not binding. Hence the rst-best allocation of e¤ort (given the
chosen organizational structure) is always obtained. This result is less obvious than it may
seem. After all, the regulators liability schemes do not take into account the existence of
7At least if there is no upper bound to the amounts that can be imposed on individual managers.
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spillover e¤ects inside the rm. However, so long as the rms owner knows the spillover
e¤ects the rst-best solution can be obtained, i.e., the rms owner can compensate for any
misallocation induced by the liability rule imposed by the regulator. Moreover, there is no
need for the rm to monitor e¤ort levels. As a nal comparison let us look at the e¤ort levels
under the two organizational structures.
3.3 Organizational comparison by e¤ort levels
Recall that the optimal marginal costs of e¤ort under a product-based organization are de-
scribed by (14) and the optimal marginal e¤ort costs under a functional organization are
determined by (22) and (23). Suppose that the marginal e¤ects of e¤ort on gross prots and
environmental damages are constant. Equations (14), (22) and (23) then imply that produc-
tion (environmental) e¤ort is higher (lower) under a product-based organization if and only
if: @i+j Dj Di@pi >
@i+j Dj Di
@ej
. Using the terminology of Besanko et al. [2], production is
the dominant function if for all levels of pi and ei this latter inequality holds. That is, a unit
increase in production e¤ort always has a higher impact on gross prots minus environmental
nes than a unit increase in environmental e¤ort. Otherwise, it is environmental protection.
Consequently one straightforwardly derives the following:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the marginal e¤ects of e¤ort on gross prots and environmen-
tal damages are constant. If, after the introduction of environmental nes, production is the
dominant function, then production e¤ort is higher under a product-based organization than
under a functional organization. If, after the introduction of environmental nes, environ-
mental protection is the dominant function, then environmental protection is higher under
a product-based organization than under a functional organization. The organizational form
that induces the highest environmental e¤ort induces the lowest production e¤ort and vice
versa.
The results above imply that there is always a dominant function in our model. Proposi-
tion 3 is then completely compatible with the observation of Besanko et al. [2, p. 458] that
if there is a dominant function, e¤ort costs tend to be higher in a functional organization.
However, it is unclear how this result could be generalized to a situation where the marginal
e¤ects are not constant.
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4 Conclusions
This paper employs a multi-task principal-agent model to examine how di¤erent liability
rules for environmental damages a¤ect the incentive schemes o¤ered to individual managers.
These schemes depend on the managerscontributions to prots and their e¤ects on nega-
tive externalities through environmental damages caused by production. The schemes are
evaluated both for a product-based and a functional organization. In the former case, a
rm is divided into product lines, whereas in case of a functional organization the rm is
organized as a collection of di¤erent functional departments, in our case a production and an
environmental department. we show how these liability rules a¤ect the choice between the
two organizational modes.
For a product-based organization it is shown that if managers do not face a limited liability
scheme, e¢ ciency is independent of who is liable for environmental damages, i.e., either the
rm or the managers. In a functional organization, however, it is optimal either to hold the
rm liable for environmental damages or, equivalently, not to hold the production managers
liable for environmental damages. That is, the nes imposed on the production manager only
a¤ect expected prots without a¤ecting the incentives.
If the marginal e¤ects of e¤ort on gross prots and environmental damages are constant,
then it is also possible to compare the e¤ort levels under the two organizational structures.
It turns out that environmental protection is higher under a product-based organization if it
becomes the dominant function after the introduction of environmental taxes. If production
is the dominant function after the introduction of environmental taxes, then production
e¤ort will be higher in a product-based organization than in a functional organization. In
sum, the organizational form that induces the highest environmental e¤ort induces the lowest
production e¤ort, and vice versa. This suggests that production and environmental protection
are substitutes rather than complements.
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